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1 Overview  
 
This case study describes FBI Major Case 216, which ultimately became a collaborative 
investigation between the FBI and site security professionals into a series of cyberattacks 
that took place from August 2003 to March 2005.  Incident response specialists at the 
National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA), located at the University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC), played a significant and crucial role in this 
investigation. The attacks encompassed over a thousand sites, including high-security 
military sites and federal research laboratories, university sites, private sector sites, and 
machines owned by individuals, both in the U.S. and in Europe.  In one case, a large 
company (Cisco) reported the theft of source code, which was later published online.  The 
case drew much concerned interest from the FBI and the Departments of Energy and 
Defense particularly because of the initial, very real possibility that the attacks were 
sponsored by a foreign state.  However, most of the damage sustained came in the form of 
time spent investigating the intrusions; notifying sites and users; and cleaning up, repairing, 
and securing the compromised systems.  Investigation participants, estimate the cumulative 
cost of the Stakkato intrusions to be in millions of dollars.  At its peak, the investigation 
involved 50 federal agents. 
 
Ultimately, the intrusions were traced back to a 19-year-old man in Uppsala, Sweden, 
nicknamed “Stakkato,” who had begun the attacks when he was 16.  Convicted of having 
gained unauthorized access to several Swedish university networks, “Stakkato” is still under 
investigation by the FBI for the Cisco code theft [1]. 
 
 
2 First signs 
 
The National Center for Supercomputing Applications, a production supercomputing facility 
first funded in 1986 by the National Science Foundation, is heavily used by thousands of 
researchers all over the world in government, education, industry, and academia.  Because 
NCSA’s resources are open and accessible, rather than hidden behind firewalls (as in the case 
of many DoD, DoE, and industrial supercomputing facilities), protecting NCSA’s systems 
from compromise is a priority.  NCSA’s Incident Response and Security Team (IRST), first 
organized in 1993, focuses on detecting and responding to attacks and intrusions and 
preventing system vulnerabilities. 
 
NCSA first became aware of the attacker's presence on March 20, 2004, when he gained 
access to an NCSA machine, from which he began testing several others for vulnerabilities.  
Jim Barlow, who leads NCSA IRST, first discovered the attack on a Sunday evening as a 
result of an alert triggered automatically by a system that monitored services such as 
intrusion detection, network flow analysis, and log files. The alert was triggered by an 
atypical surge in the number of connections for this machine at this particular time of day. 
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Barlow first had to establish that some service was not being run legitimately on the machine 
that would account for the surge in activity, so he scanned the machine to find out which 
ports were open.  He also began collecting the network flows to and from the machine to 
see if the traffic could explain the surge’s cause.  The scan alerted Barlow that there was a 
problem:  open port 41705 was running a backdoor SSH client, which granted remote access 
to an unauthorized user.  Had other hosts been similarly compromised?  A scan of the entire 
network revealed that indeed, two other machines were running the same malware.  In fact, 
one of these machines turned out to be a supercomputer that was also a node on the 
TeraGrid, a National Science Foundation (NSF)-funded project that provides distributed 
high-performance computing resources across multiple sites to scientific researchers. The 
world's largest, most comprehensive distributed computing infrastructure for open scientific 
research, the TeraGrid is used for extremely large-scale simulations in areas such as 
molecular dynamics, seismology, atmospheric science, and cosmology.   Like the NCSA 
machine, the other nodes are also located at universities and national laboratories across the 
country. 
 
Figure 1.  Map of 
the nine partner 
sites of the NSF 
TeraGrid. 
Dedicated 
machines at each of 
these sites together 
form a powerful 
distributed 
supercomputer 
facility capable of 
extremely large-
scale computations.  
Academic partners 
include NCSA 
(UIUC), San Diego 
Supercomputing 
Center (University 
of California at San 
Diego), Texas 
Advanced Computing Center (University of Texas at Austin),  Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center (University of 
Pittsburgh), and supercomputing facilities at Caltech, Indiana University, and Purdue.  Argonne National 
Laboratory (ANL) in the southwestern Chicago suburbs and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). 
At the time of the attacks in spring 2004, the TeraGrid’s combined resources included 24 
teraflops of computing power and 1 petabyte of data storage, connected by a high-speed 
network.  As of late 2007 those numbers had grown to more than 750 teraflops and 30 
petabytes, interconnected at 10-30 gigabits/second via a dedicated national network. [3] 
2.1 Contac t ing  o ther  compromised s i te s  
 
The TeraGrid’s security group meets on a weekly basis to discuss policy and incidents 
encountered by member sites, which made it easy for NCSA IRST to communicate what 
they'd found.  Early on, it became apparent that many TeraGrid sites had been compromised 
in much the same way: the attacker would install trojans that could then collect usernames 
and passwords from that site. Because many of the TeraGrid sites share the same user base, 
many users simply use the same usernames and passwords for multiple accounts, making it 
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easier for the attacker to move between TeraGrid sites.  Users at several different sites 
reported receiving taunting messages from an intruder calling himself Stakkato.  One user 
even reported that, having hacked into her machine, Stakkato had even erased her file 
directory and deleted a year and a half’s worth of email after eavesdropping on an email 
exchange with a system administrator in which she called the intruder a “quaint hacker” [4]. 
 
It became clear to the investigators that the attacker had a number of specific vulnerabilities 
that he would attempt to exploit at a given site.  As the investigation progressed, NCSA 
IRST compiled a list of all these vulnerabilities, as well as the directories where the attacker 
would typically install malware and store the rootkit he used to harvest usernames and 
passwords.  Whenever he moved to a new site, NCSA IRST would contact that site’s 
administrators and send them this information to alert them to the case and help them track 
the intruder. 
 
 
3 Law enforcement is brought in 
 
Often, when a system administrator discovers that a machine has been compromised, he will 
shut the machine down, investigate the incident, and clean up and secure the machine; the 
attacker will then depart for more vulnerable sites.  However, in this case, the attacker was 
extremely persistent in breaking into TeraGrid machines through compromised accounts, 
causing NCSA investigators to wonder about his motivation.  These sites were difficult to 
secure because they comprised a large number of endpoints at universities and research 
institutions that were not under the control of the TeraGrid organization.  While the 
thousands of users at these sites could be notified that their accounts had been compromised 
or were at risk for compromise, they could not necessarily be required to change their 
passwords or modify their online behavior.   It was at this point that the NCSA investigators 
realized they needed to notify the FBI. 
 
When an intruder persistently threatens computing resources and institutional and user data, 
a university has an acknowledged interest in assisting with a federal investigation.  However, 
because of privacy concerns, data crucial to the investigation cannot be provided unless 
search warrants and subpoenas are issued.  First, the NCSA security team had to alert the 
UIUC legal department of their intent to engage with the FBI.  The UIUC legal department 
then arranged a meeting between NCSA's security team, the campus security team, the 
campus police, and a local FBI agent.  The NCSA security team described what had 
happened and what they knew of the extent of the compromises both at NCSA and at other 
sites who were also in the process of contacting their local FBI.  The FBI Springfield 
Division opened a case, as did a number of other field divisions in whose territories the 
compromised sites were located.   
 
Computer intrusion cases are especially time-critical; however, the collection of essential 
evidence can be problematic.  Simply confiscating an entire compromised machine as 
evidence may render a crucial computing resource unavailable to the victim organization and 
its users for the duration of the investigation.  In the case of the NCSA attacks, for example, 
one of the machines was a supercomputer used not only by NCSA and other UIUC 
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researchers but by researchers all over the country.   One solution to the problem of 
collecting evidence from heavily-used computing resources is to create an image, or exact 
reproduction, of the hard disk.  However, this too can be problematic:  the volume of such 
hard disks is often measured in terabytes (thousands of gigabytes), and sifting through all of 
this data not only raises potential user privacy issues but can be needlessly overwhelming and 
time-consuming to investigators.  Additionally, because university data retention policies 
often have short timeframes to safeguard user privacy, evidence of an intruder’s activities 
recorded in network traffic logs often disappears with the periodic instution-mandated 
destruction of these logs. 
 
For the next few weeks the NCSA security team continued to meet with the FBI and with 
University legal counsel to determine what data the FBI required for the investigation, a 
crucial and necessary prerequisite to serving subpoenas or search warrants for computer 
data.  This involved determining which IP addresses had been affected, what kind of data 
they had already, and what items, specifically, they would need to request from other sites.  
In particular, asking for specific data items, rather than simply requesting all data and sifting 
through it, cut down substantially on the time and effort needed. 
 
Establishing a productive working relationship between a case agent and an institution or 
organization victimized by cyberattacks is extremely important to the smooth and efficient 
collection of essential evidence, especially if this is the agent’s first cyberinvestigation.  While 
Craig Adams, the agent covering MC 216, had a background as a systems engineer which 
aided him considerably in the investigation, his working knowledge of cybersecurity issues 
and procedures at the time was not as extensive as that of a typical, active incident 
responder.   The NCSA security team was able to provide guidance in determining which 
logs would be most relevant to the case.   
 
4 Method of  attack 
 
Further investigation by the NCSA security team revealed that the intruder's plan of attack 
for infiltrating and compromising large computing sites was complex and well-organized. 
Initially, he used known exploits to infiltrate a small number of hosts onto which he then 
installed trojaned secure shell (trojan-ssh) clients.  Users would log into other systems, 
inadvertently using the trojaned ssh clients which would then harvest their usernames, 
passwords, and the IP addresses of the machines they were logging into.   
 
With these stolen credentials, the attacker then would gain access to the external systems and 
use a rootkit, a software package used to exploit vulnerabilities, to gain administrative 
privileges on those systems, where he would then repeat the process, installing trojan-ssh 
clients, collecting more usernames and passwords, gaining access to new machines, and thus 
gradually increasing his network of compromised systems.   
 
As the attacker’s “network” evolved, it also came to include machines that served as 
supporting infrastructure.  The trojaned SSH clients would send harvested user data back to 
yet another compromised machine that served as a password collector, which stored the data 
for future use.  All user data was addressed to a statically-configured hostname, which the 
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attacker managed anonymously through a public dynamic DNS site.  Dynamic DNS permits 
a domain owner to map a static domain name to different machines, so whenever the 
attacker thought he had been discovered or was being monitored, he would simply move the 
password collector to a different machine, which he did several times over the course of the 
investigation. 
 
The attacker also maintained a repository for his malware on another of the machines he had 
compromised early on which a web server was running.  Unbeknownst to this machine’s 
owner, the attacker accessed and downloaded these tools every time he gained access to a 
new host and used them to escalate his privileges on the new conquest.  Finally, to make the 
task of tracking him difficult (or impossible), the attacker would log into compromised 
systems circuitously by way of a number of distributed intermediate systems. 
 
Ironically, once discovered, the components of this relatively sophisticated support 
framework increasingly proved key to monitoring the attacker’s movements and, ultimately, 
to his apprehension.   
 
 
Figure 2. The attacker's U.S. network, his point of 
entry, and his supporting infrastructure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Tracking the intruder 
 
By May 2004, the holes that had allowed the intruder to install his backdoor software had 
been patched, and NCSA systems had been secured against him.  The NCSA security team 
knew what kind of behavior to watch for, what kinds of exploits the intruder was using, and 
how he managed to compromise and obtain user accounts. Now that they had a good idea 
how the intruder was operating, they could try to monitor and track his movements from 
host to host, using a network of honeypots, while at the same time attempting to trace him 
back to his originating IP address. 
 
5.1 Creating  a  honeypot 
 
A honeypot is a kind of decoy system set up to lure and possibly trap intruders intent on 
breaking into a real information system.  It is usually unprotected and may contain data or 
resources that appear to be valuable in some way.  A honeypot may be a single machine or 
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an entire network that appears to be part of the intruder's target but is actually isolated and 
carefully monitored for unauthorized access. 
 
Honeypots are deliberately exposed and vulnerable to attack and can often be compromised 
within a matter of minutes or even seconds.  The challenge that the investigators faced was 
ensuring that the honeypot they constructed would attract this specific hacker.  However, 
they were able to accomplish this by tailoring the site's vulnerabilities to the intruder's 
preferred method of attack: in this case, inserting a username, password, and honeypot IP 
address directly into the intruder’s password collector to lure him to it, in the hope that he 
would install a trojan-ssh client on the decoy machine.  The NCSA honeypot, for example, 
was made to look as if it were used, with a few logins a day, and a "user" logged in whose 
activities the attacker could monitor.   
 
As the investigation came to encompass several DOE sites, the investigators began to 
develop a network of honeypots so that when the intruder stole a user's credentials, the first 
thing he would do after logging in was to check out the SSH known host spot to find out 
what machines the user typically logged into from that account and then try to use the same 
credentials to try to access the user's account on that machine.  Anticipating this behavior, 
the investigators created several user accounts on multiple machines in the honeypot 
network which used the same usernames and passwords—an easy target for the intruder. 
 
Stakkato did take the bait and hack into these accounts as anticipated.  In many cases 
monitoring an intruder’s behavior in a honeypot can be the key to catching him.  However, 
in this case, the investigators were able to reverse engineer Stakkato’s rootkit (Section 
5.2.3.1) and trace him back to his point of origin before the honeypot surveillance yielded 
significant results. 
 
 
5.2 Monitoring  poin ts  of  presence  
 
To determine the location from which the attacker was operating, the investigators 
conducted a manual traceback.  They began by posting inquiries on some security mailing 
lists about who or which sites were responsible for particular IP addresses, making it clear 
that they were only interested in looking at traffic and not at data.  In this case, it helped that 
the intruder tended to use a path through the same machines for weeks at a time.  The 
traceback was a highly collaborative activity, involving security engineers at NCSA and 
SDSC, FBI personnel, system administrators at ISPs and universities in Sweden, and many 
other individuals and organizations here in the U.S. and abroad. 
 
To track the intruder and monitor his behavior, the investigators ultimately came to rely on 
four different points of presence:  the site where the intruder stored and downloaded his 
software, the intruder’s password collector, the machines the intruder moved through as he 
made his way into the United States, and ultimately, the intruder’s own home machine. 
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5.2.1 Malware repository 
 
The website from which the intruder downloaded his trojan SSH client and rootkit was a 
server maintained by a CS student in Maryland for his own purposes.  Rather than simply 
advise the machine's owner to clean up his site and patch his vulnerabilities, the investigators 
contacted him, told him what was going on, and asked him if he could let them have his 
weblogs on a regular basis.  The student readily agreed and ultimately gave root access to the 
investigators so they could simply log in and take whatever logs they needed, which they did, 
every day, morning and night. 
 
5.2.2 Password collector 
 
The investigators also began to monitor the intruder's password collector as it shifted from 
machine to machine.  Whenever someone would log into a machine on which the intruder 
had installed a trojaned SSH client, the client, spoofing the genuine SSH client, would send 
the username, password, and IP address of the compromised machine back to the password 
collector.  The password collector itself could easily be moved, thanks to a dynamic DNS 
hosting the intruder had embedded in the software, which permitted him simply to go to the 
dynamic DNS site and change the IP address, causing all the trojaned SSH clients to then 
transmit user information to the new machine.  The investigators would contact the owners 
of the machines that were being used as password collectors and request their logfiles so 
they could find out what sites had been compromised with the trojaned SSH client.   
 
Monitoring the sites that served as the intruder’s password collectors allowed the 
investigators to notify the hacked sites and send them the usernames and passwords that had 
been compromised.  However, it also provided some insight into the intruder’s behavior and 
frame of mind. For example, he often chose as usernames the names of some of the 
investigators who were involved in tracking him down, such as the FBI agent who opened 
up the case in Chicago, or a system administrator in California whose site he’d attacked. 
 
5.2.3 Login path 
 
Investigators also began contacting system administrators for the machines that appeared to 
serve as the attacker’s entry points into the U.S. As the investigators uncovered the intruder’s 
trail, they found that his usual modus operandi was to move through a few machines in Europe 
first before making the jump to U.S.-based servers, from which he would then launch his 
attacks.   
5.2.3.1 The Unsuckit tool 
 
The Linux rootkit Stakkato used for all his attacks was called the Suckit (short for “Super 
User Control Kit”) rootkit.  Written by two Czech hackers in 2001, Suckit needed no kernel 
support, which enabled it to evade a common administrative security measure of disabling 
support for loadable kernel modules.  Suckit used a spoofed packet to bypass firewall 
configurations, enabling a hacker to create and encrypt a remote-access, connect-back shell.  
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This rootkit was also hard to detect because it did not alter the target filesystem and could 
hide processes, files, and connections, fooling common Linux security tools such as fuser, 
lsof, netstat, ps, and top. [5] 
 
An important breakthrough in the traceback conducted by the incident responders occurred 
in July 2004 when the owners of one of the machines in the attacker’s regular network routes 
relocated to a new position at a small Massachusetts college named Simon’s Rock.  An 
interested site administrator there began to preserve tcpdumps of all the traffic on this 
machine and became involved in the investigation.  As he examined the attacker’s rootkit, he 
realized that it could be reverse engineered if he could just break the rootkit’s encryption key, 
giving investigators clear text of all the attacker’s activities.  With the help of a DoE 
researcher, he was able to accomplish just that, creating a tool named—logically—Unsuckit. 
 
The Unsuckit tool proved a powerful weapon against the intruder.  Investigators were able 
to stream data from the tcpdumps of compromised machines through the tool, generating 
clear text of the attacker’s every movement—every command he ran, all the directories and 
files he accessed on machines providing tcpdumps.  However, after a couple weeks the 
Simon’s Rock system administrator who developed the Unsuckit tool realized the attacker’s 
traffic was decreasing, signaling that he possibly suspected discovery and was preparing to 
move on.  The administrator knew he would have to act quickly, so, starting with 
connections away from the Simon’s Rock site, he was able to trace a path back through all 
the machines the attacker was using or had connected through.  
 
5.2.4 Originating machine 
 
The Simon’s Rock traceback ended in a machine with a dynamic DNS hostname, running 
both an IRC server and a web server, located in Sweden.  It was the final piece of the puzzle: 
the intruder’s own home machine. Because these services were open to the world, the 
machine’s traffic could be monitored legally but covertly using web and IRC proxies.  The 
IRC server yielded a list of nicknames (nicks), some of which the investigators recognized 
from elsewhere; with more digging, they were able to come up with information on the 
other IRC users, which included the suspect’s girlfriend and several of his friends. 
 
The suspect’s webpage and other public directories on his machine also provided useful 
information: the handle Stakkato; photographs of himself and his classmates, four of whom 
had accounts on his machine; his likes (milk) and dislikes (white hats); and, tellingly, several 
phrases that appeared in the taunting emails he sent to site administrators and users whose 
accounts and machines he’d compromised. 
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Figure 3.  Photos of the intruder known as Stakkato, found in public directories on his home web 
server. Upper left:  Stakkato’s drink of choice makes it probable that he is the author of the IRC profile 
on his machine that declares, “I like milk.”  Lower right: Stakkato’s school picture.  He is in the 
middle of the front row (arrow above his head, the word “ARE” on his shirt). 
 
 
6 Apprehension 
 
While FBI and NCSA investigators were monitoring and tracking Stakkato’s movements in 
the U.S., in Sweden there was a parallel investigation into a very similar series of attacks at 
several universities, including one that compromised over 400 machines.   As in the U.S. 
investigation, Swedish system administrators also began tracing the frequency of certain 
words and phrases from the password collector and other compromised machines back to 
the IRC channel on Stakkato’s machine.  After sifting through large numbers of IRC logs 
and identifying certain handles, Swedish investigators were able to match the nicknames of 
suspects to their actual owners. 
 
Swedish law enforcement, however, was unable to engage as quickly and actively as the FBI 
did in Major Case 216, in large part because Swedish privacy laws are very strict and make 
wiretapping suspects far more difficult.  On November 1, 2004, a new law took effect that 
justified wiretapping for the purposes of data intrusion cases.  In the meantime, along with 
their American counterparts, the Swedish investigators continued to watch, wait, and gather 
evidence.  Swedish law enforcement finally engaged with the FBI and NCSA investigators in 
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early January, and finally, on March 9, 2005, they apprehended Stakkato and seized his 
machines and data.  The intrusions ceased immediately. [6] 
 
7 Lessons learned 
 
Large-scale cyberattack investigation requires a trusting, effective working 
relationship between law enforcement and IT.  The most important lesson to come out 
of Major Case 216 was that cooperation and collaboration was essential among law 
enforcement, cybersecurity professionals, administrators of targeted sites, and targeted 
organizations themselves.  Cybersecurity professionals and administrators at targeted sites 
were a driving force in the investigation because they had specific expertise in handling 
security issues at their sites,  effective tools for log and data analysis, the ability to closely 
monitor the intruder’s activities on their systems, and a more or less trusted network of 
contacts at other sites and institutions, which became vital as the scope of the investigation 
widened. In particular, NCSA incident responders played a major role in the investigation.  
The former Special Agent with whom NCSA IRST collaborated argues that assistance from 
an organization similar to NCSA continues to be necessary to the investigation of large-scale 
cyberattacks.  He recommends that trusted security professionals at targeted sites should be 
engaged in the investigation process as early as possible. 
 
Information needs to be a two-way street between investigators and site 
administrators.  Site administrators have a strong interest in keeping their systems secure.   
While information must be provided in a judicious manner, ensuring that potential 
information sources such as site admins are clearly informed about both the nature and the 
severity of a series of attacks helps to ensure their participation in the investigation.  Major 
turning points in MC 216, such as the ability to closely monitor the webserver that 
functioned as Stakkato’s malware repository (Section 5.2.1) and the development of the 
Unsuckit tool (Section 5.2.3.1) were due to the assistance of willing, cooperative 
administrators in Maryland and Massachusetts who had been made aware of the scope of the 
attacks and the investigation.  
 
Likewise, communication between investigators is also important.  Agents may only 
be working on the portions of a cyberintrusion case specific to their locales, but they still 
need to clearly understand the case as a whole so that they can communicate effectively with 
potential information sources.  Communications between field offices should contain clear, 
comprehensive summaries that include crucial information that can be communicated to 
potential information sources. 
 
Agents working on investigations into cyberattacks need to be properly equipped 
with the appropriate hardware and software.  Throughout the duration of 216, tools for 
parsing data were scant and equipment was often old and outdated, which frequently 
hindered collaboration with NCSA incident response specialists.  Laptops with up-to-date, 
stable, secure operating systems and high-speed internet are basic necessities for working on 
computer-related cases.  Analysis tools and the prerequisite knowledge for using them 
effectively are also crucial and can improve the effectiveness of working relationships with 
incident responders and site administrators. 
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There is a need for widespread, if basic understanding of computing and computer 
systems-related issues across the Bureau.  This became a concern for communication 
both internally and externally.  In 2004, agents submitting time-sensitive requests such as 
trap-and-trace found that supervisors were often unfamiliar with concepts and terminology 
in computer networking and security critical to the case.  Additionally, agents who were 
unfamiliar with computing and cybersecurity-related issues were often less effective in 
communicating with and getting cooperation from administrators and machine owners who 
were potential information sources. 
 
Documentation mechanisms across the Bureau need to reflect accurately how 
criminals employ digital technologies.  For example, in 2004 agents found that the 
paperwork for submitting trap-and-trace requests was designed for phone surveillance 
requests and that there were no appropriate fields on these forms for IP or email addresses.  
To complete their requests, they would have to manually modify the form.  Similarly, 
electronic communications containing leads concerning computer trespass cases often 
included IP addresses or URLs instead of the names or locations of subjects, and because 
these terms were less recognizeable, they were less likely to be indexed and correlated.  As a 
result, many agents worked on similar intrusions in isolation, unaware for some weeks that 
they all could have been perpetrated by Stakkato. 
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8 Timeline of  216 Events 
 
Following is a chronology of events that occurred before, during, and after the investigation 
of FBI Major Case 216. 
 
August 2003 • First known related compromised box discovered with rootkit, 
tools installed in directory. 
October 2003 – 
December 2003 
• Attacks on machines at BNL, Caltech, Colorado.   
• At Caltech, hacker actually initiates talk sessions with users and 
taunts them (e.g., I own the machine, you can’t kick me off, I’ll be 
back…)  
March 2004 • Attacks on machines at Berkeley, LBL, NCAR ANL, SDSC. 
• From one compromised machine at NCAR, an attack is launched 
on NCSA machines. 
• Attacks on TeraGrid machines. 
April 2004 • A system administrator at Stanford begins to notice a pattern of 
attacks and puts up a Web site describing the vulnerabilities the 
hacker is exploiting and his tools of choice, with particular 
attention to abnormal TCP traffic on Port 53 [7]. 
• Intruder sends bragging email referencing Kevin Mitnick, with 
phrases such as “my kung fu is great.” 
• The website of Tsutomu Shimomora at SDSC is hacked and 
content replaced with graphics, profanities, and messages along 
the lines of “you’re not all that.”  Shimomura is famous as one of 
the investigators who helped track down and catch cybercriminal 
Kevin Mitnick in 1995. (By 2004, Shimomura was no longer 
working at SDSC and website was no longer active.)  
• At White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, an attacker gains 
access to an internal, unclassified machine providing weather 
forecasts. 
• The DOE’s Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC) 
notifies the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams 
(FIRST) about the attacks on the national labs. 
• AP and Washington Post cover March 2004 attacks, labeling them 
“TeraGrid attacks.” [8] 
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May 2004 • Working with NCSA and SDSC, administrators at UMN and 
CMU detect intruder traffic on their servers.  Although they are 
not yet able to decrypt his rootkits, the investigators are able to 
decrypt other tools and activities, leading to the discovery of a 
password collector at the University of Colorado (Boulder?). 
• Internet2 community is contacted about the attacks, but there is 
no response. 
• Part of Cisco’s Internetworking Operating System (IOS) is illegally 
copied and posted on the Internet. 
June 2004 • Investigators contact and start tracking malware web distribution 
site. 
July 2004 • First traceback completed. 
• Owner of a compromised machine at CMU moves to Simon’s 
Rock College, MA.  A system administrator at Simon’s Rock 
becomes involved and, with help from a DOE lab researcher, 
reverse engineers the hacker’s rootkit, creating the Unsuckit tool. 
August 2004 • The manual traceback is completed and is found to match the 
traceback performed by security professionals in July.  This 
traceback provides a crucial part of the legal foundation for the 
case against the intruder. 
• Swedish contacts are traced back to same individual via Swedish 
IRC channels. 
September 2004 – 
January 2005 
• While the FBI builds their case, intruder’s movements are 
monitored closely to prevent the attacks from escalating out of 
control.  System administrators at sites where attacks occurred are 
notified and provided with information about detecting attacks 
and patching holes. 
• Joint FBI/incident response efforts to apprehend individual are 
increased. 
January 2005 – 
March 2005 
• Swedish law enforcement agency begins cooperation with 
investigation after realizing that it links up with a similar 
investigation in Sweden. [6] 
• The intruder, a recent high school graduate known online as 
Stakkato, is apprehended. 
• Once the apprehension is made, all activity at monitoring points 
stops. 
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